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Abstract
We consider a union-firm wage bargaining in which the union must choose between strike and holdout in case of
disagreement, and preferences of the union and the firm are expressed by sequences of discount rates varying in time.
We show that there may exist inefficient subgame perfect equilibria in the model under which the union engages in
several periods of strikes prior to reaching a final agreement. For an inefficient equilibrium to exist, the status quo
wage must be sufficiently low and the amounts that the firm offers for itself in the subgame perfect equilibrium under
the exogenous always strike decision in every odd period before reaching an agreement must be sufficiently low.
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1 Introduction
In the union-firm wage bargaining originally introduced in Fernandez and Glazer (1991),
Haller and Holden (1990) and further analyzed, e.g., in Holden (1994), Bolt (1995), Houba
and Wen (2008), the union and the firm bargain sequentially over a new wage contract
and in case of disagreement the union must choose between strike and holdout. In this
literature on wage bargaining the parties are assumed to have constant discount rates.
However, since patience of the parties represented by their discount rates may be changing
over time due to many circumstances, e.g., economic, financial, political, social, environ-
mental, health or climatic issues, the framework with varying discount rates appears to
be more suitable to model reality than the original bargaining with constant discount
rates. A study of this issue is initiated in our previous works on wage bargaining, i.e., in
Ozkardas and Rusinowska (2014a,b) where we consider a generalized wage bargaining in
which the preferences of the union and the firm are expressed by sequences of discount
rates varying in time. More precisely, in Ozkardas and Rusinowska (2014a) we determine
subgame perfect equilibria for several cases with the exogenously given strike decision
and also consider a general model with no assumption on the commitment to strike. In
Ozkardas and Rusinowska (2014b) we derive the exact bounds of the equilibrium payoffs
and characterize the equilibrium strategy profiles that support these extreme payoffs.
In the original wage bargaining with constant discount rates, apart from the analysis
of efficient equilibria, Fernandez and Glazer (1991) also present a result on inefficient
equilibria. In Ozkardas and Rusinowska (2014a,b) only efficient equilibria in the wage
bargaining with varying discount rates are considered, and to the best of our knowledge,
the important issue of inefficient equilibria has not been considered for the generalized
framework so far. Do inefficient equilibria exist in the model with varying discount rates,
and if so, what is the impact of the generalized framework on an agreement being reached?
The aim of the present note is to study inefficient equilibria in the model with discount
rates varying in time in which the union must choose between strike and holdout in
case of disagreement. We show that in the generalized model, inefficient subgame perfect
equilibria may exist under which the union strikes for uninterrupted T periods prior to
reaching a final agreement. For an inefficient equilibrium to exist, the status quo wage
must be sufficiently low and the amounts that the firm offers for itself in the subgame
perfect equilibrium under the exogenous always strike decision in every odd period before
reaching an agreement must be sufficiently low. Time varying discount rates can work
in favor or against the agreement, i.e., they can make the agreement more or less likely,
depending on how patience of the parties changes over time. In particular, an inefficient
equilibrium is getting less (more) likely if patience of the union decreases (increases) in
time.
2 Inefficient equilibria in the generalized model with strikes
We consider the following wage bargaining procedure between the union and the firm
originally introduced in Fernandez and Glazer (1991) and Haller and Holden (1990).
There is a status quo contract w0 ∈ (0, 1) that specifies the wage that a worker is entitled
to per day of work. This wage contract needs to be renegotiated by the union and the firm
who bargain sequentially in discrete time and a potentially infinite horizon. The union
proposes a certain contract W 0 ∈ [0, 1] in period 0 and if the firm accepts it, then the
agreement is reached and the payoffs are (W 0, 1 −W 0), i.e., the union gets W0 and the
firm (1 −W0). If the firm rejects the offer, then the union can either go on strike and
then both parties obtain (0, 0) in the current period or hold out which gives the payoffs
(w0, 1−w0). Independently of the strike-holdout decision of the union, after rejecting the
offer it is the firm’s turn to make a new offer Z1 in period 1, etc. This alternating-offers
procedure continues until an agreement is reached. If an offer is rejected by a party, then
the union decides whether or not to strike in that period and the rejecting party makes its
offer in the next period. The result of the wage bargaining is either a pair (W,T ), where
W is the wage contract agreed upon and T ∈ N is the number of proposals rejected in
the bargaining, or a disagreement denoted by (0,∞) and meaning the situation in which
the parties never reach an agreement.
Fernandez and Glazer (1991) analyze the model in which preferences of the union and
the firm are expressed by constant discount rates δu and δf , respectively, and Haller and
Holden (1990) even assume that both parties have the same discount rate δ. Contrary to
this literature and similarly to our previous work (Ozkardas and Rusinowska, 2014a,b), we
analyze the wage bargaining in which preferences of the union and the firm are described
by sequences (δu,t)t∈N and (δf,t)t∈N of discount factors (rates) varying in time, where δu,t
is the discount factor of the union and δf,t is that of the firm in period t ∈ N, δi,0 = 1,
0 < δi,t < 1 for t ≥ 1, i = u, f . Let for each t ∈ N
δu(t) :=
t∏
k=0
δu,k, δf (t) :=
t∏
k=0
δf,k (1)
and for 0 < t′ ≤ t
δu(t
′, t) :=
δu(t)
δu(t′ − 1)
=
t∏
k=t′
δu,k, δf (t
′, t) :=
δf (t)
δf (t′ − 1)
=
t∏
k=t′
δf,k (2)
In other words, δi(t
′, t) denotes the product of the discount rates of party i from period
t′ till period t.
The utility of the result (W,T ) for the union is equal to the discounted sum of wage
earnings
U(W,T ) =
∞∑
t=0
δu(t)ut (3)
where ut = W for each t ≥ T , and if T > 0 then for each 0 ≤ t < T
ut = 0 if there is a strike in period t ∈ N
ut = w0 if there is no strike in period t.
The utility of the result (W,T ) for the firm is equal to the discounted sum of profits
V (W,T ) =
∞∑
t=0
δf (t)vt (4)
where vt = 1−W for each t ≥ T , and if T > 0 then for each 0 ≤ t < T
vt = 0 if there is a strike in period t
vt = 1− w0 if there is no strike in period t.
The utility of the disagreement is equal to
U(0,∞) = V (0,∞) = 0 (5)
We assume that the infinite series in (3) and (4) are convergent.
By ∆u(t) and ∆f (t) we denote the generalized discount factors of the union and the
firm in period t, respectively. They are defined as follows, for every t ∈ N+:
∆u(t) :=
∑
∞
k=t δu(t, k)
1 +
∑
∞
k=t δu(t, k)
, ∆f (t) :=
∑
∞
k=t δf (t, k)
1 +
∑
∞
k=t δf (t, k)
(6)
The generalized discount factors take into account the sequences of discount rates varying
in time and the fact that the utilities are defined by the discounted streams of payoffs.
Note that for the special case of constant discount rates, i.e., if δu,t = δu and δf,t = δf for
every t ∈ N+, ∆u(t) = δu and ∆f (t) = δf .
In Ozkardas and Rusinowska (2014a,b) we consider only efficient equilibria in the
generalized wage bargaining where the agreement is reached immediately in period 0. We
recall the following offers that have been crucial for the analysis presented in Ozkardas
and Rusinowska (2014a). Let for every t ∈ N:
W
2t
= 1−∆f (2t+ 1) +
∞∑
m=t
(1−∆f (2m+ 3))
m∏
j=t
∆u(2j + 2)∆f (2j + 1) (7)
Z
2t+1
= W
2t+2
∆u(2t+ 2) (8)
where
w0 ≤ Z
2t+1
∆u(2t+ 1) (9)
As shown in Ozkardas and Rusinowska (2014a), (7) and (8) are the offers made by the
union in an even period and the firm in an odd period, respectively, under a certain SPE
in the case when the strike decision is given exogenously and the union is committed
to strike in every disagreement period. Additionally, these are the offers made under a
SPE in the general model (i.e., without any assumption on the commitment to strike) if
the union is sufficiently patient (i.e., if the generalized discount factors of the union are
sufficiently high) as given by condition (9). The union’s offer W
2t
is determined by the
generalized discount factors of the union in all even periods following the given period and
by the generalized discount factors of the firm in all odd periods following that period. The
interpretation of W
2t
is similar to that of the SPE offer in the original Rubinstein model
(Rubinstein (1982)) with the same constant discount rate δ as provided in Shaked and
Sutton (1984): the payoff of the first mover, 1
1+δ
= (1−δ)(1+δ2+δ4+ · · · ), is equal to the
sum of the shrinkages of the cake during the periods when the offers made in even periods
are rejected. Indeed, the cake shrinks from δ2t to δ2t+1, i.e., by (1−δ)δ2t if it is rejected in
period 2t. We can interpretW
2t
in a similar way, but with the generalized discount factors
instead of the constant and common discount factor δ. The firm’s offer Z
2t+1
in an odd
period as given by (8) is equal to the union’s offer in the subsequent period, discounted by
the generalized discount factor of the union. The union is indifferent between accepting
the SPE offer made by the firm in an odd period and rejecting that offer but submitting
its SPE offer in the subsequent even period (that would be accepted by the firm).
Now we will prove the result concerning inefficient subgame perfect equilibria in this
model where both parties make unacceptable offers and the union strikes for uninterrupted
T periods prior to reaching a final agreement.
Theorem 1 Consider the generalized wage bargaining model with preferences of the
union and the firm described by the sequences of discount factors (δi,t)t∈N , where δi,0 = 1,
0 < δi,t < 1 for t ≥ 1, i = u, f . If wˆ ∈ [0, 1] and T ≥ 1 are such that
w0 ≤ wˆ
∑
∞
k=T δu(1, k)
1 +
∑
∞
k=1 δu(1, k)
(10)
and for each τ ∈ N such that 2τ + 1 < T
wˆ ≤ 1−
∑
∞
k=2τ+1 δf (1, k)∑
∞
k=T δf (1, k)
(
1− Z
2τ+1
)
(11)
where Z
2τ+1
is defined in (7)-(9), then there is a subgame perfect equilibrium with a strike
of T periods (from period 0 till T − 1) followed by an agreement wˆ reached in period T .
Proof: Let wˆ and T be such that (10) and (11) are satisfied. Let W
2t
and Z
2t+1
denote
the offers of the union and the firm, respectively, defined in formulas (7), (8) and (9).
Consider the following two families of strategies:
Minimum wage strategies:
- The union: always propose w0, accept an offer y if and only if y ≥ w0, and never go
on strike if there is a disagreement
- The firm: always propose w0 and accept an offer x if and only if x ≤ w0.
Always strike strategies:
- The union: in period 2t (t ∈ N) propose W
2t
, in period 2t+ 1 accept an offer y if and
only if y ≥ Z
2t+1
, and always go on strike if there is a disagreement
- The firm: in period 2t+ 1 propose Z
2t+1
, in period 2t accept an offer x if and only if
x ≤ W
2t
.
- If, however, at some point, the union deviates from the above rule, then both parties
play thereafter according to the minimum wage strategies defined above.
Furthermore, we define a pair of strategies that forms a SPE. Obviously we do not limit
ourselves to describing the strategies along the equilibrium path, but also provide the
strategies that both parties are required to play after a deviation. We consider the fol-
lowing strategies:
(i) In period 0, the union proposes 1 and the firm accepts x if and only if x ≤ w0
(ii) In every period t < T , where no deviation has occurred prior to period t:
- if t is even then the union proposes 1 and the firm accepts x if and only if x ≤ w0
- if t is odd then the union accepts y if and only if y ≥ Z
t
, and the firm offers w0
- the union strikes if there is a disagreement.
(iii) In period T , where no deviation has occurred prior to period t:
- if T is even then the union proposes wˆ and the firm accepts x if and only if x ≤ wˆ
- if T is odd then the union accepts y if and only if y ≥ wˆ, and the firm proposes wˆ
- the union strikes if there is a disagreement.
(iv) If the union deviates, then any party plays the minimum wage strategy thereafter.
(v) If the firm deviates but the union does not, then any party plays the always strike
strategy thereafter.
First of all, note that if the parties follow the above strategies, then there is no
agreement till period T − 1 and the union strikes. Indeed, the firm rejects the union’s
offer of 1, since w0 < 1. Also the union rejects the firm’s offer of w0, since by virtue of
(10) and (11), Z
2τ+1
> w0 for every 2τ +1 < T . In period T , wˆ is proposed and accepted.
The pair of strategies defined by (i) - (v) is a SPE. In every subgame such that a party
has deviated before, this pair of strategies is the Nash equilibrium, since the minimum
wage strategies as well as the always strike strategies form the SPE, as shown in Ozkardas
and Rusinowska (2014a). To make the present note more self-contained, we recapitulate
some details concerning this part of the proof.
First, consider the minimum wage strategies. If a party changes its strategy, with the
strategy of the another one being fixed, then the deviating party cannot be better off:
neither if at some point it makes an offer different from w0, nor when it accepts/rejects
an offer which gives the party less/more than the considered profile of strategies (w0 for
the union and 1−w0 for the firm). The union will not be better off when it deviates from
its never strike decision and goes on strike in case of a disagreement.
Next, consider the always strike strategies. Note that W
2t
≥ w0 and Z
2t+1
≥ w0 for
every t ∈ N. In order for the union not to deviate from its strike decision in period 2t, it
must hold w0+w0
∑
∞
k=2t+1 δu(2t+1, k) ≤ Z
2t+1∑∞
k=2t+1 δu(2t+1, k), which is equivalent
to (9). In order for the union not to deviate from its strike decision in period 2t+1, it must
hold w0 ≤ W
2t+2
∆u(2t + 2), which is satisfied, since w0 ≤ Z
2t+1
∆u(2t + 1) ≤ Z
2t+1
=
W
2t+2
∆u(2t + 2). Consider a subgame such that the union has already deviated in an
earlier period. If the parties play the always strike strategies, then they use the minimum
wage strategies thereafter. Hence, this profile is a Nash equilibrium in every subgame
starting after the subgame with the deviation. Consider a subgame such that the union
has not deviated before. If the union deviates in period 2t and proposes x 6= W
2t
≥ w0,
then the firm switches to the minimum wage strategy and the union cannot be better off
by this deviation. Also the firm cannot be better off by deviating in 2t+1 and proposing
y 6= Z
2t+1
. It is also easy to show that no party can be better off by a deviation when
replying to an offer of the other party.
Note that by virtue of (10), the union prefers to strike till period T − 1 instead of
reaching an earlier agreement. More precisely, from condition (10) the union prefers to
strike till period T − 1 instead of reaching an agreement immediately. Note that (10)
implies the following condition, for every 0 < T ′ < T
w0
∞∑
k=T ′
δu(1, k) ≤ wˆ
∞∑
k=T
δu(1, k) (12)
To see that, note that
wˆ
∞∑
k=T
δu(1, k) ≥ w0
(
1 +
∞∑
k=1
δu(1, k)
)
= w0
(
1 +
T ′−1∑
k=1
δu(1, k) +
∞∑
k=T ′
δu(1, k)
)
>
> w0
∞∑
k=T ′
δu(1, k)
By virtue of (12), the union prefers to strike till period T−1 instead of reaching an earlier
agreement in period T ′.
Any deviation of the union prior to period T would not be better to the union, because
if the union deviates, e.g., by trying to reach an earlier agreement that the firm would
prefer than wˆ in period T , then the parties play thereafter the minimum wage strategies
that give w0 to the union.
By virtue of (11), also the firm would not be better off by deviating and trying to
reach an earlier agreement, because if in any period 2τ + 1 < T the firm makes an offer
that the union would prefer, then the parties play thereafter the always strike strategies.

Theorem 1 presents conditions for the existence of an inefficient subgame perfect
equilibrium under which there is a strike for a number of uninterrupted periods prior
to reaching an agreement. Condition (10) says that the status quo contract must be
sufficiently low to assure that the union prefers going on strike for some time to reaching
an earlier agreement. Condition (11) means that the amounts that the firm offers for itself
in the subgame perfect equilibrium under the always strike decision in every odd period
before reaching the agreement must be sufficiently low, to assure that the firm would not
prefer to reach an earlier agreement.
Fernandez and Glazer (1991) prove (Theorem 2) that in the wage bargaining1 with
constant discount rates δu and δf , if wˆ is such that
1− δ1−Tf + δ
1−T
f z ≥ wˆ ≥ δ
−T
u w0 (13)
where
w =
1− δf
1− δuδf
and z =
δu(1− δf )
1− δuδf
(14)
are the solutions to Rubinstein’s original bargaining game2 (Rubinstein, 1982), then there
is a subgame perfect equilibrium with a strike of T periods followed by an agreement of
1 In Fernandez and Glazer (1991) the wage offers are made over discrete time periods t ∈ {1, 2, ...} with the
union proposing in odd-numbered periods and the firm proposing in even-numbered periods. In our setup this
is also the union that starts the bargaining but in period 0, i.e., it makes its offers in even-numbered periods.
2 In Fernandez and Glazer (1991) the exact condition is
(
1− δ1−Tf
)
F + δ1−Tf z ≥ wˆ ≥ δ
−T
u w0 with w =
(1−δf )F
1−δuδf
and z =
δu(1−δf )F
1−δuδf
, but without loss of generality we assume that F = 1.
wˆ. Note that if we apply our Theorem 1 to the case of constant discount rates, δu,t = δu
and δf,t = δf for every t ∈ N+, then we recover the result of Fernandez and Glazer (1991).
Whether the generalized framework with varying discount rates works in favor or
against the agreement being reached does depend on how patience of the parties changes
over time. In particular, if the union becomes less (more) patient with time while patience
of the firm does not change, then an inefficient subgame perfect equilibrium under which
the union engages in several periods of strikes prior to reaching a final agreement becomes
less (more) likely. To see that, assume that the union has an arbitrary sequence (δu,t)t∈N
of discount rates varying in time such that δu,t < δu for a certain 0 < δu < 1 and all t ∈ N.
Let the discount rates of the firm remain constant, i.e., δf,t = δf for a certain 0 < δf < 1
and all t ∈ N. Then, we have for every T ≥ 1, δTu >
∑
∞
k=T δu(1,k)
1+
∑
∞
k=1 δu(1,k)
, and therefore
wˆ ≥ w0
1 +
∑
∞
k=1 δu(1, k)∑
∞
k=T δu(1, k)
>
w0
δTu
On the other hand, for each t ∈ N, ∆u(2t + 2) < δu, W
2t
≤ w and Z
2t+1
≤ z, and
therefore
wˆ ≤ 1−
∑
∞
k=2τ+1 δf (1, k)∑
∞
k=T δf (1, k)
(
1− Z
2τ+1
)
≤ 1− δ1−Tf + δ
1−T
f z
In other words, if the union becomes more impatient, then an inefficient equilibrium with
strikes prior to reaching an agreement is getting less likely. On the contrary, one can show
in the analogous way that if the union is more patient, i.e., it has a sequence (δu,t)t∈N of
discount rates varying in time such that δu,t > δu for a certain 0 < δu < 1 and all t ∈ N,
then an inefficient equilibrium becomes more likely.
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